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Abstract 
Between 1990 and 2001 the Argentine peso appreciated by 80 percent in real terms, and its 
overvaluation has been singled out as one of the main suspects in the debate on the causes of 
the Argentina collapse of late 2001. This paper assesses the degree of real misalignment in 
Argentina over the Convertibility period using a model in which the equilibrium real 
exchange rate is defined as the value consistent with (i) a balance of payments position 
where any current account imbalance is financed by a sustainable flow of international 
capital (external equilibrium), and (ii) traded / nontraded sector productivity differentials 
(internal equilibrium). Empirical implementation of the model suggests that the initial real 
appreciation of the peso, between 1990 and 1993, was consistent with the productivity 
increases that Argentina enjoyed following the stabilization of the economy after the 
hyperinflation of the late 1980s. But after 1996 a widening gap opened between the observed 
real exchange rate and that consistent with a sustainable net foreign asset position. Our 
estimates indicate that in 2001 the peso was overvalued by over 50 percent. The model 
allows us to assess how much of the overvaluation resulted from Argentina’s inadequate 
choice of anchor currency and how much from a divergence of fundamentals between 
the US and Argentina, ultimately due to the maintenance of policies inconsistent with the 
peg. We find that both factors played a role in the overvaluation accumulated between 1977 
and 2001 that preceded the collapse of the Convertibility regime. 
JEL codes: F31, F41
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I. Introduction  
In late 2001, after many months of recession and mounting financial turmoil, Argentina was 
forced to abandon its currency board. The demise of the decade-old dollar peg was 
accompanied by a financial crisis of unprecedented severity, and followed by a dramatic 
devaluation of the peso. From the 1 peso = 1 US dollar exchange rate of the Convertibility 
decade, the Argentine currency had steadily depreciated up to nearly four pesos per dollar by 
mid 2002 before recovering towards three pesos per dollar at the end of that year. 
The causes of the financial collapse, as well as its implications for macroeconomic and, 
especially, exchange rate policy, have attracted considerable attention. A number of 
observers have underscored the role of fiscal imbalances in precipitating the crisis, while 
others blame self-fulfilling default expectations in international financial markets1. In this 
debate, the trajectory of the real exchange rate of the peso has played a prominent role. 
Between 1990 and 2001, Argentina’s real effective exchange rate appreciated by almost 80 
percent.  In spite of  the productivity gains that Argentina probably achieved over the 1990s 
–a result of the stabilization and reform of the economy after the hyperinflation of the late 
1980s– a majority of observers concur that the real exchange rate had become overvalued 
by 2001, especially after the devaluation of the Brazilian real in 1999 and coinciding with 
the persistent appreciation of the US dollar at the end of the decade. 
However, the extent of the peso overvaluation, as well as its significance in triggering off the 
crisis, remain disputed2. Furthermore, assessments of peso misalignment advanced by 
various observers are typically based on rough comparisons between the actual and past 
values of some measure of the real exchange rate –that is, they implicitly rely on a PPP– like 
assumption that the equilibrium real exchange rate is constant over time. 
In this paper we go beyond that crude approach and develop a formal analytical model for 
the study of the equilibrium real exchange rate. We implement the model empirically to 
assess the misalignment of the Argentine peso. Thus, the paper is most closely related to the 
literature on real misalignment and equilibrium exchange rates3.
1 Fiscal imbalances are particularly stressed by Mussa (2002) and Teijeiro (2002). On the role of 
investor expectations see Stiglitz (2002) and Sachs (2002).  
2 The view that by 2000-2001 the peso was significantly overvalued has been stated, among others, 
by Calvo et al. (2002), Corden (2002), Hausmann and Velasco (2002), Roubini (2001), 
Rodrik (2002), Sachs (2002) and Stiglitz (2002). Most of these authors do not provide a specific 
estimate of the magnitude of the overvaluation, although Sachs (2002), for example, places it in 
the 30-40 percent range. A lone dissenter is Schuler (2002). 
3 See Williamson (1994), Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998), Baffes et al. (1999), MacDonald and 
Stein (1999), or MacDonald (2000) for recent contributions on equilibrium exchange rates. 
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Our approach extends the literature along several dimensions. First, the model we construct 
is capable of encompassing two leading approaches to real exchange rate determination4. On 
the one hand, it assigns a role to productivity differentials, along the lines of the 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. In our framework productivity differentials explain the 
evolution of the price of non-tradables relative to tradables. Since such price determines the 
allocation of resources within the economy, this captures what we may label the ‘internal 
equilibrium’ of the economy. On the other hand, the model also assigns a role to current 
account sustainability [as in Frenkel and Mussa (1985)], which can be viewed as the 
‘external equilibrium’ of the economy. 
Second, to assess empirically the degree of real misalignment, we rely on an orthogonal 
decomposition of the observed exchange rate series into a permanent component, which 
captures long-run movements, and is therefore identified with the equilibrium real exchange 
rate, and a transitory component, which captures equilibrium-reverting movements and thus 
corresponds to the short-run deviation from equilibrium or misalignment5.
Third, our framework allows us to go beyond measuring misalignment and assess the factors 
behind the observed real exchange rate trajectory. On the one hand, we gauge the roles of 
those domestic factors related to the internal and external equilibrium respectively. This 
permits us to assess the contribution of structural reforms and spending decisions to the real 
exchange rate path. On the other hand, we also examine how the peg to the US dollar 
contributed to the misalignment of the peso. The fact that trade with the US accounted for 
only a small fraction (around 15 percent) of Argentina’s total trade, and an even smaller 
share of its GNP (less than 3 percent) has led some observers to conclude that the US dollar 
was the wrong anchor currency for Argentina, and that this inadequate choice is largely to 
blame for the misalignment of the peso at the end of the 1990s6. Our empirical calculations 
allow us to evaluate this assertion. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief overview of the main 
existing approaches to the equilibrium real exchange rate. Section 3 lays out the analytical 
model, and section 4 describes the empirical strategy for its implementation. Section 5 
reports the empirical results, and assesses the estimated equilibrium real exchange rate as 
well as its main determinants. Section 6 goes one step beyond and examines the impact of 
the recent evolution of the US dollar in the overall misalignment of the peso. Finally, 
section 7 concludes. 
4 The model follows along the lines of Alberola et al. (2002). 
5 Huizinga (1987) and Clarida and Gali (1994) also interpret the permanent component of the real 
exchange rate as a measure of equilibrium. 
6 See Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002), whose analysis shows that on the basis of observed 
macroeconomic comovement the Euro would have been a less-inadequate choice of anchor for 
Argentina’s hard peg. 
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II. Exchange rate appreciation and misalignment 
After decades of monetary mismanagement, the hard peg to the dollar that Argentina 
adopted under the Convertibility regime in 1991 quickly led to nominal stability and 
financial deepening7. In the process, however, the peso experienced a large real appreciation. 
Figure 1 shows that throughout the Convertibility decade the real effective exchange rate 
(REER) of the peso remained consistently above8 its historical average over the period 
1960-2000, by a margin that ranged between 15 and 50 percent. This persistent appreciation 
has led many observers to conclude that the peso was overvalued, particularly at the end of 
the decade. 
There is broad consensus among economists that large real overvaluations have negative 
macroeconomic consequences. Their correction requires at best the adoption of painful 
adjustment programs, and may lead at worst to an abrupt currency collapse and a major 
financial crisis. In addition to the Argentine episode, there are numerous other examples of 
abrupt currency collapses in recent memory, including Mexico (1994), East Asia (1997), and 
Brazil (1999). In each of these episodes, a few observers had warned of the impending 
collapse in view of what they perceived as an unsustainable overvaluation of the currency9.
More generally, analyzing the evidence from a sample of 93 countries over 1960-94, 
Goldfajn and Valdés (1999) conclude that once a currency appreciates significantly, a 
smooth return to equilibrium becomes highly unlikely. In their sample, 85 percent of the 
cases in which currencies reached a misalignment of 25 percent or more ended abruptly with 
a collapse of the nominal exchange rate. This is particularly relevant for the Argentine case, 
in which much of the policy discussion in the run up to the crisis, and even ex post analysis, 
has centered on the question of whether the authorities might have succeeded in salvaging 
the Convertibility regime, achieving whatever real depreciation was necessary through 
nominal deflation10. The answer to this question therefore depends, among other things, on 
the actual degree of overvaluation of the peso in the final years of Convertibility. 
Assessing the degree of misalignment, however, is not straightforward. The most popular 
method relies on the purchasing power parity (PPP) doctrine. In its absolute form, it 
7 However, financial deepening under Convertibility was accompanied by an increasing degree of 
financial dollarization which, according to many observers, made the financial system vulnerable and 
helped precipitate the financial crash. See for example De la Torre and Schmukler (2003). 
8 Throughout we define the real exchange rate so that an increase is an appreciation. 
9 Dornbusch and Werner (1994) and Werner (1997) examine the case of Mexico, and Chinn (1998) 
that of East Asia. 
10 In this vein, it has been argued that a course of action preferable to the one that eventually 
emerged would have involved full dollarization, letting nominal price adjustment realign 
subsequently the real exchange rate. The feasibility of such strategy has been widely debated; see 
Roubini (2001) and De la Torre and Schmukler (2003). 
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maintains that after conversion into a common numeraire a basket of goods should cost the 
same at home and abroad; i.e. the equilibrium real exchange rate should equal 1. A weaker 
version of PPP, sometimes referred to as relative PPP, holds that changes in nominal 
effective exchange rates must compensate for the inflation differential between a country 
and its trading partners, implying that the equilibrium real exchange rate is constant over 
time (although it may not equal 1). 
Based on the relative PPP notion of the equilibrium real exchange rate, which in Figure 1 is 
measured by its long-term average, the peso would have been undervalued in 1990, but 
would have become increasingly overvalued after the introduction of the Convertibility Law 
and the currency board in 1991. The PPP-based overvaluation peaked initially in 1993 at 
about 40 percent, declined later through 1996 to about 14 percent, and rose again to exceed 
its average historical level by almost 50 percent in 2001. Thus the PPP approach would point 
towards a persistent and significant overvaluation over the whole decade. 
However, the PPP approach to exchange rate misalignment can also be misleading. 
Rogoff (1996) presents evidence supporting a positive relationship between income and 
price levels. That is, a given a sum of dollars converted into a less developed economy 
currency at the nominal exchange rate will buy a larger basket of commodities and services 
than can be bought in the US. Krugman (1978) and Frenkel (1981) also find that deviations 
of exchange rates from their PPP equilibrium (both absolute and relative) are large, fairly 
persistent and with little tendency to revert towards a fixed long run equilibrium level. There 
are two well-documented factors that can contribute to the empirical failure of PPP. The first 
one is the existence of non-traded goods. The second is imperfect substitutability between 
traded goods produced in different countries. We shall taken them in turn. 
If the exchange rate is viewed as the relative price of traded goods, then the existence of 
non-traded goods is irrelevant. But if the exchange rate is viewed as an asset price (i.e., the 
price of one national money in terms of another) then the appropriate price index has to be 
broader, given that the value of money is given by the reciprocal of the general price level, 
which includes both traded and non-traded goods and services. 
The introduction of non-traded goods poses a challenge for the PPP hypothesis, if for 
example there are productivity biases as noted by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). The 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis postulates that under fairly general assumptions non-traded 
goods prices will be lower in the country with lower productivity in the traded goods sector 
(usually the poorer country). As a result, a basket of traded and non-traded goods will be 
cheaper in the lower wage (i.e. the poorer) country. By the same token, increases in relative 
productivity will be associated with an increase in relative prices, that is, an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate. 
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The same result can arise without international productivity differences if there are instead 
demand asymmetries or endowment biases. For example, Genberg (1978) argues that if the 
income elasticity of demand for non-traded goods is greater than unity, under the assumption 
of unbiased productivity growth the relative price of non-traded goods will rise with income. 
Bhagwati (1984) proposes instead a model which predicts lower price levels in poorer 
countries if they are labor-abundant relative to rich countries. Under the assumption of 
similar consumption tastes across countries (which rules out preference biases towards 
non-tradable goods that could raise wages enough to offset the endowment disparity), wages 
and the price of labor-intensive non-tradable goods will be relatively lower in poorer 
countries. 
Thus, in addition to productivity asymmetries, demand asymmetries and factor endowments 
may also drive the relative price of non-tradables. In reality, the empirical failure of PPP 
may be due, at least in part, to differences in endowments (poorer countries are usually more 
labor abundant than rich countries) and demand biases (services usually represent a larger 
share of the consumption basket in richer economies). But productivity biases still seem an 
integral part of the model: richer countries would be so because of higher labor productivity. 
Empirical evidence pointing in this direction is reported by De Gregorio et al. (1994) or 
Alberola and Tyrväinen (1998), who find a strong link between changes in the price of 
non-tradables and changes in productivity differentials between tradables and non-tradables 
in OECD countries, as predicted by the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. 
For the Argentine case, Figure 2 plots the real exchange rate and two series that capture 
international productivity differentials over 1990-200011. The first is overall labor 
productivity in Argentina relative to its main trading partners. The second is the ratio of 
non-tradable prices to tradable prices, again measured relative to Argentina’s main trading 
partners. According to the Balassa-Samuelson argument, this relative price differential 
between countries should be driven by their respective tradable-nontradable productivity 
differentials. 
Inspection of the figure reveals a remarkably similar pattern for both measures of 
productivity differentials. Regardless of which one is used, casual empiricism would seem to 
support the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, as Figure 2 suggests a very close correlation 
between the productivity series and the real exchange rate. During the first years of the 
currency board, following the stabilization of the economy after the hyperinflation of the late 
1980s, the graph shows that Argentina enjoyed significant productivity increases relative to 
her trading partners, which may help explain the sharp real appreciation of the peso between 
1990 and 1993. Relative productivity stalled after 1993 and this process was accompanied 
by a parallel correction in the REER until 1996. After 1996 productivity starts recovering 
11 In the figure, the two relative productivity series have been rescaled (to zero mean) for ease of 
comparison.
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(according to relative prices until 2000 and according to relative labor productivity 
until 1998) and the real exchange rate appreciates again, although during this period the 
appreciation outpaces the relative productivity gains. All in all, however, the real exchange 
rate seems to have evolved roughly in line with productivity differentials, at least until 1995. 
Aside from non-traded goods, the other main factor that can lead to the breakdown of PPP is 
the lack of perfect substitution between domestic and foreign traded goods. The 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is based on the assumption of perfect substitutability between 
traded goods produced at home and abroad, but in reality traded goods produced in different 
countries are not identical, and the relative price of foreign and domestic tradables (i.e. the 
terms of trade) shows significant time variation. This in turn may result in substantial 
changes in the real exchange rate over time. 
To account for this variability of exchange rates, Mussa (1984) proposed a model of 
exchange rate determination, which can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, 
changes in the exchange rate affect the trade balance, the current account balance and its 
stock counterpart, the country’s net foreign asset position12. Under this approach to exchange 
rate determination, the exchange rate must be consistent with an external position where any 
current account imbalance is financed by a sustainable flow of international capital, which in 
turn is determined by the desired stock of foreign asset and liabilities among nations. 
A country may run current account deficits (surpluses) and therefore decumulate 
(accumulate) assets in the adjustment process towards its desired stock. Such imbalances 
would be due to cross-country differences in the propensities to save and invest, which are 
assumed independent from exchange market developments. In the long-run, however, when 
assets are at their desired levels, the current account and the exchange rate should be 
consistent with a stable net foreign assets-output ratio [see the empirical applications in 
Broner, et al. (1998), Alberola et al. (1999), and Alberola and López (2000)]. 
Figure 3 reviews the evolution of the stock of Net Foreign Assets (NFA) relative to GNP for 
Argentina over 1990-200113. Inspection of Figure 3 reveals that during the 1990s Argentina 
witnessed a steady increase in its foreign liabilities: the NFA stock fell from 
about -15 percent of GNP in the early 1990s to close to -40 percent of GNP at the end of the 
decade. Figure 3 also indicates that the decline in the country’s net asset position accelerated 
after the Asian crisis of 1997. Before 1997 Argentina was adding liabilities at a rate of 
about 1 percent of GNP per year, but after 1997 it started adding about 4 percent of GNP per 
year. If the real exchange rate had adjusted to this reduction in wealth, it should have 
depreciated, leading to a trade balance surplus to compensate for the interest payments 
12 Changes in the net foreign asset position, and therefore in the net wealth of the country, also 
affect the real exchange rate, through the wealth effect on consumption. 
13 See Section IV for a description of the procedure used in the computation of the net foreign asset 
position. 
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associated with the increasing liabilities. Such adjustment did obviously not take place, and 
therefore the disparate evolution of net foreign asset holdings and the observed real 
exchange rate in the late 1990s suggests that a gap opened between the actual exchange rate 
and the one that would have been consistent with a sustainable NFA / GNP ratio. 
To examine these issues more rigorously, the next section develops a theoretical framework 
that incorporates the two ingredients reviewed above, productivity differentials and asset 
equilibrium. Importantly, the approach combines both theoretical strands without restricting 
the exchange rate to be determined by either one of them alone. 
III. The Economic Model 
Consider two economies, each producing two goods: one tradable (denoted by the subscript 
T in what follows) and one non-tradable (N). The (log) real exchange rate (q) is defined as 
the relative price of two consumption baskets at home and abroad: 
q = p-(s + p*),       (1) 
where s is the (log) nominal exchange rate, defined as the price of foreign currency in terms 
of domestic currency, and p and p* are the (log) domestic and foreign price indices 
respectively. Throughout we use asterisks to denote foreign variables. An increase in q
represents an appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
The consumer price index (CPI) for each country is a weighted-average of the exportable, 
non-tradable, and importable prices, all expressed in the currency of the respective country: 
p=(1-DN-D T)pT+D Np N +D T (s+p T*)     (2) 
p*=(1-D*N-D* T)p*T+D* Np* N +D* T (p T -s), 
where the Ds are the weights of the respective goods in the consumer basket. Substituting 
these expressions in (1), assuming that DN=D* N, and rearranging terms we obtain 
q = (1-D T -D* T)q X+D N q I,      (3) 
where qX=pT-(s+p*T) is the relative price of domestic tradables in terms of foreign tradables, 
and qI=(pN-pT)-(p*N-p*T) is the price of non-tradables relative to tradables across countries. 
Here qX captures the competitiveness of the economy, and as we shall explain shortly it is 
related to the evolution of the foreign asset position. Since sustainable capital flows 
eventually lead to the desired stocks of assets and liabilities across countries, the equilibrium 
level of qX is associated with the external equilibrium of the economy. On the other hand, the 
cross-country differential in relative tradable-nontradable prices qI is related to productivity 
differentials. Since these prices determine the allocation of resources across sectors in a 
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given country, the equilibrium level of qI can be associated to the internal equilibrium of the 
economy. 
The equilibrium exchange rate is attained when both qX and qI are at their equilibrium 
values, and thus follows from internal and external equilibrium: 
INXTT qqq DDD  )1(
*
      (4)
with the bars denoting equilibrium values. We next characterize the internal and external 
equilibrium of the economy. 
III.1 Internal equilibrium 
The differential behaviour of sectoral relative prices between countries determines the 
evolution of the internal real exchange rate. Sectoral prices are in turn related to 
the evolution of sectoral productivity. These notions can be illustrated using a simple model 
with two production factors, labor (L) and capital (K). Output in each sector is determined 
by a Cobb-Douglas production technology: 
YN=ANLNGKN1-G       (5)
YT=ATLTTKT1-T,
where 0<T,G<1 represent the intensity of labor in each sector. Labor is perfectly mobile 
between sectors (but not across countries), implying nominal wage equalization: 
WT= WN =W.         (6) 
Labor is paid the value of its marginal product Yi/Li=W/Pi. Under Cobb-Douglas 
technology the ratio of marginal productivities is proportional to the ratio of average 
productivities:
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.      (7) 
From (7) it follows that the (log) sectoral price differential is equal to the labor productivity 
differentials plus a drift capturing the relative intensity of labor. Expressing with lower case 
the natural logarithms of sectoral labor productivities, (7) reduces to 
Np - Tp =log(T/G)+(yT-yN).      (8) 
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Neglecting constant terms and denoting n = (yT-yN)- (y*T - y*N), the internal equilibrium 
exchange rate is just: 
nqI  ,        (9) 
III.2 External equilibrium 
Portfolio models of real exchange rate determination (Mussa 1984) focus on asset 
equilibrium, as defined by the attainment of agents’ desired foreign asset stock. Over time, 
the accumulation of net foreign assets (F) is given by the current account balance (CA),
which equals the trade balance (XN), plus the net income that residents receive (or pay) on F:
¨F=CA=XN+i*F       (10) 
where i* is the international interest rate, which is assumed given. It will be more convenient 
to focus on the trajectory of the foreign asset stock relative to GNP, which can be written 
¨f=ca=xn+(i*-g) f       (11) 
where f and xn denote the ratios to GNP of the respective uppercase variables, and g is the 
rate of GNP growth. If the Marshall-Lerner condition holds, an increase in the relative price 
of domestic tradables qX shifts consumption toward foreign tradables and worsens the trade 
balance. Consistent with this interpretation, it is plausible to assume that the trade balance as 
a percentage of GNP (xn) is given by: 
xn=-Jqx, J>0.      (12) 
The capital account deficit reflects the desired rate of accumulation of net foreign assets by 
the home country, which is assumed to depend on the divergence between the current level 
of assets as a percentage of GNP (f) and the desired equilibrium level ( f ), itself determined 
by exogenous factors such as saving preferences and demographics which will not be 
modelled here 
)( ffaf  ' a>0      (13) 
Equation (13) indicates that if the actual net foreign asset position is below its desired level, 
agents will accumulate assets to reach the target; conversely, if f is greater than f agents 
will be reduce their asset holdings until they reach f .
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Equating (13) and (11) after using (12), and solving for qx we get: 
qx =[a/J] (f- f )+ [(i*-g) / J] f      (14) 
Equation (14) shows that the external real exchange rate depends on (i) the divergence 
between current and equilibrium asset holdings; and (ii) the current stock of net foreign 
assets f. Defining the equilibrium external real exchange rate Xq as that consistent 
with f = f  (i.e. the exchange rate consistent with asset holdings at their equilibrium level) it 
follows that 
Xq = [(i*-g)/J] f ,       (15) 
III.3 The equilibrium real exchange rate 
Substituting (9) and (15) into (3), we get the final expression for the equilibrium exchange 
rate:
q =[(1-DT-D* T)(i*-g)/J] f + D N n .      (16) 
Observe that in principle both (1-DT-D* T)(i*-g)/J and DN should be positive, and thus the 
equilibrium real exchange rate appreciates in response to both a higher long-run asset stock 
and a higher relative productivity differential14.
IV. Empirical issues 
The theoretical model outlined above identifies two fundamentals for the evolution of the 
real exchange rate15: the level of net foreign assets f and relative sectoral productivity (n). In 
this framework, a suitable empirical model for estimation would be 
q=E0 + EF f + EN n + u      (17) 
with slope parameters EF=(1-DT-D* T)(i*-g)/J and EN=DN.
                                                
14 The assumption i*>g amounts to ruling out dynamic inefficiency. 
15 For a country like Argentina, where a large share of export are commodities, whose international 
price is given in foreign country, the evolution of equilibrium real exchange rate could be also 
influenced by the evolution of the prices of exportable commodities. Also, the interest rate 
differentials has been used in this type of literature as long-run exchange rate fundamentals. Here we 
focus on this extremely parsimonious approach which allows for a neat interpretation of the results. 
See Gay and Pellegrini (2003) for a wider model to estimate equilibrium exchange rates in 
Argentina. 
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At this stage, one would be tempted to think that if a long-run cointegration relationship 
between the real exchange rate and its fundamentals can be found, it will automatically yield 
an estimate of the equilibrium rate. However, for this to be true, one would have to observe 
the equilibrium levels of the fundamentals, and then apply a cointegration analysis to them. 
Unfortunately, we can observe only the actual values of the variables, and therefore some 
further econometric manipulation is needed to estimate the equilibrium real exchange rate. 
Intuitively, the observed exchange rate can be decomposed into two components: the first 
one, when the fundamentals are at their steady state levels, would be the equilibrium 
exchange rate 
q =E0+EF f +EN n        (18) 
The second component, when the fundamentals are away from their respective steady states, 
would correspond to the deviation of the exchange rate from its equilibrium level. 
tqˆ =E0+EF tfˆ +EN tnˆ        (19) 
where tfˆ  and tnˆ  denote deviations of the fundamentals from their equilibrium values. 
Our strategy for estimation of the equilibrium real exchange rate is based on the econometric 
decomposition of the observed real exchange rate into a transitory and a permanent 
component. The estimated equilibrium exchange rate is taken to be the 
permanent component, while the transitory component reflects deviations from equilibrium. 
In what follows, we first relate the equilibrium exchange rate with the concept of 
cointegration, and then show how cointegration allows for the extraction of the two 
unobserved components from the observed exchange rate and fundamental series. 
In order to understand the link between equilibrium and cointegration, it is useful to depart 
from the PPP view, which implies a constant value for the equilibrium real exchange rate q
or, in econometric terms, that qt is integrated of order zero (I(0)). Failure of PPP to hold does 
not necessarily imply that no equilibrium exists, but rather that the equilibrium may be 
time-varying. In our case, if q, f, and n are cointegrated, then u in (17) will be I(0), and an 
equilibrium real exchange rate will exist. In other words, q will fluctuate around a 
time-varying equilibrium characterized by the long-run cointegrating vector [1, -EF, -EN].
As noted above, the time-varying equilibrium exchange rate cannot be inferred by simply 
imposing the cointegration vector on the observed values of the explanatory variables. In this 
regard, cointegration among a set of variables presents a very desirable property: it allows 
for the decomposition of the relationship among the variables into two components: a 
permanent or secular I(1) component, which describes the long-run properties of the 
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relationship, and can be identified with a time-varying equilibrium path; and a transitory I(0) 
component, which corresponds to deviations from the permanent component and represents 
departures of the fundamentals from their steady state values. 
The decomposition of the observed series into their permanent and transitory components 
requires identification of the basic properties of the latter. We follow Gonzalo 
and Granger (1995) and derive a decomposition where the transitory component does not 
Granger-cause the permanent component in the long run, and where the permanent 
component is a linear combination of contemporaneous observed variables. In other words, 
the first restriction implies that a change in the transitory component will not have an effect 
on the long-run values of the variables16. The second restriction makes the permanent 
component observable and implies that all the information necessary to extract it is 
contained in the contemporaneous observations of the variables. 
Let us consider the 3x1 vector xt = [qt, ft nt]' which under the null hypothesis of one 
cointegration vector admits the following representation: 
tptptptt exxDxDx 3'' '  1111 ... ,    (20)
where et is a vector white noise process with zero mean and variance 6 and 3 is 3 x 3 matrix 
with rank 1. Given that 3 is not full rank, it can be written as the product of two rectangular 
matrices D and E of order 3 x 1 such that 3=DE’. In turn, E is the cointegration vector and D
is the factor-loading vector. Next, we can define the orthogonal complements DA and EA as 
the eigenvectors associated with the unit eigenvalues of the matrices (I- D (D’ D)-1 D’) and 
(I- E (E’ E)-1 E’), respectively. Notice that D’AD = 0 and E’A E = 0. With this notation we can 
write
ttt xxx ')'()'(
11 EDEDDEDE A

AAA  ,     (21) 
where EA (D’A EA)-1 DA xt captures the permanent component and D (E’ D )-1 E’ xt the 
transitory component. Gonzalo and Granger (1995) show that the transitory component 
defined in this way does not have any effect on the long-run values of the variables, which 
are captured by the permanent component. 
The identification of the permanent component with equilibrium implies that 
t
1
t xx A

AAA DEDE )'( and tt xx ')'(ˆ
1EDED  ,
from where an estimate of the equilibrium exchange rate and its deviation follows directly. 
                                                
16 In essence, this decomposition rules out hysteresis in the real exchange rate.  
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A final issue to consider in this section is the extent to which the statistical model can yield 
additional knowledge regarding the theoretical model. As noted above the theoretical model 
encompasses the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis and the balance of payments approach. It is 
therefore natural to enquire if the data provide support for both views, for one of them only, 
or for neither. This can be assessed by constructing test statistics for the following 
hypotheses on the cointegration vector: 
Balassa-Samuelson approach: EF =0 
Under the null EF=0, the real exchange rate would be determined only by the 
Balassa-Samuelson model, and would evolve according to relative productivity differentials. 
Under the null, the test statistic, which we denote BASA, is distributed as a F2(1). 
Balance of payments approach: EN = 0 
The case EN = 0 corresponds to a situation in which either n does not enter the model or 
DN = 0 (i.e., the economy is fully tradable). The Balassa-Samuelson effect then plays no role 
as determinant of the real exchange rate. The test statistic, that we denote BOP, is distributed 
as a F2(1) under the null. 
PPP: EF = EN = 0 
If EF = EN = 0, the real exchange rate is stationary, as posited by the PPP approach. 
Econometrically we should find a cointegration vector of the form [1, 0, 0]. Under the null, 
the test statistic, denoted PP, is distributed as a F2(2). Notice also that it would be possible to 
discriminate further between absolute and relative PPP, depending on whether the 
cointegration vector is centered around 0 (absolute PPP) or not (relative PPP). 
V. Misalignment and its sources 
In this section we estimate the equilibrium real exchange rate for the Argentine peso. The 
sample covers the period 1960-2001 and the data are annual. We first describe the 
construction of the series and then present the results. 
V.1 Data 
Empirical estimation of our model requires data on three variables: the real effective 
exchange rate q, the stock of net foreign assets as a percentage of GNP f, and relative 
sectoral productivity n. We use a CPI-based index of the real effective exchange rate 
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(henceforth REER)17, whose weights are based on Argentina’s bilateral trade flows averaged 
over the period 1998-2000. We construct weights for 40 trading partners which combined 
account for 90 percent of Argentina’s trade. Figure 4 reports the weights corresponding to a 
higher level of aggregation distinguishing only five trading partners: Europe, United States, 
Asia, Mercosur and the rest of the World (ROW). Mercosur is Argentina’s main trading 
partner, accounting for almost 40 percent of her total trade. Within Mercosur, Brazil is the 
leading trading partner, with about 30 percent of Argentina’s trade. Next comes Europe, 
with 25 percent (of which 23 percent corresponds to the Euro area). The US follows with 
17 percent, and finally the rest of the world accounts for about 5 percent of Argentina’s 
trade.
The stock of net foreign assets F can be computed by accumulating past current account 
balances: 
Ft = ¦
 
t
0j
CAt-j + F0.        (22) 
Of course, to implement this procedure we still need an initial value F0. We take it from 
Broner et al. (1998), who estimate F1965 at US$-3,853 million; f is then computed as the ratio 
of F to the U.S. dollar-denominated GNP18.
Finally, data on sectoral productivity or even for overall productivity are not available for 
Argentina and many of the partner countries for the sample period. However, we take 
advantage of the already robust evidence of a long-run relation between sectoral productivity 
and sectoral prices [see, among others, Canzoneri et al. (1999), Alberola and 
Tyrväinen (1999)] to use an index of relative sectoral prices as a proxy for sectoral 
productivities. More precisely, we use the comparative index of the relative price of 
non-tradable versus tradable goods devised by Kakkar and Ogaki (1999) for estimation 
purposes: we proxy n with the (log) ratio of Argentina’s consumer price index (CPI) to the 
wholesale price index (WPI), relative to the corresponding ratio for Argentina’s trading 
partners. The trade weights used in the computation are those used to construct the real 
effective exchange rate. 
17 Results with GDP-based deflator (an alternative which would not include imported tradables in 
the computation of the index) yield very similar results. 
18 As a caveat, this way of measuring of the stock of net foreign liabilities does not take into 
account the default in the eighties which amounts to a haircut on the stock of liabilities. But note that 
this downward shift in the debt stock would also imply a higher risk premium on future Argentine 
debt (v.g an expected) upward shift in the parameter which relates n and the real exchange rate). 
Since this would imply both a time varying parameter and a somewhat arbitrary determination of the 
post-default net foreign asset position we consider that the gain from performing these adjustments is 
not evident. 
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V.2 Econometric Results 
Table I reports the results of Johansen cointegration tests for Argentina using a VAR of 
order 3. Inspection of the table indicates that on the basis of the maximal eigenvalue test one 
can reject at the 5 percent level the null of no-cointegration in favor of the existence of one 
cointegration vector. 
Table I. Cointegration 

Ho: rd  Eigenvalue    Trace   O-max    Critical Val 5% 
                                     Trace  O-max 
     2      0.0077     0.2619   0.2619    8.1800  8.1800 
  1      0.1769     6.8829   6.6211   17.9500  14.9000 
  0      0.4672    28.2870  21.4041a  31.5200  21.0700 

Cointegration vector: nfq 69.082.10  E
Loading Matrix: D= [-1.14 (s.e. .25)  -.01 (s.e. .06) -.18 (s.e. .11)]’ 

PPP = 24.43a  BASA=16.91a BOP=23.99a

a. Indicates rejection of the null at the 5 percent. 
The table also shows the cointegration vector E and the loading matrix D (whose standard 
errors are shown in parentheses). As predicted by the analytical model, the cointegration 
vector uncovers a positive relationship between the real exchange rate and the stock of net 
foreign assets and relative productivity growth. Also, the magnitude of the parameter 
estimates is comparable to that reported by Alberola et al. (1999), who apply a similar 
specification to 12 OECD currencies. Our estimate of EF is slightly higher than those 
reported in that paper (which are always below 1), but this is consistent with a situation in 
which (i) Argentina has faced higher interest rates than OECD countries on its (negative) net 
foreign assets; (ii) the degree of openness of Argentina is lower than in OECD countries, so 
that the term (1-DT-D* T) is correspondingly larger; and (iii) Argentina’s growth performance 
over the past four decades has been less successful than that of OECD economies. 
As for the VAR loading factors shown in the table, we find that that the only loading factor 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level is the one for the real exchange rate 
equation. In other words, the error-correction term does not enter the equations for 
productivity and net foreign assets. 
Table I also reports the BASA, BOP and PPP statistics described above. Recall that BASA is 
the test statistic for the null hypothesis that the real exchange rate follows the 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis alone, while BOP corresponds to the hypothesis that the 
Balance of Payments approach suffices to explain the time path of the real exchange rate. 
 22
The 5 percent critical value for both statistics is 3.84. In turn, the PP statistic tests the null 
hypothesis of PPP, and its 5 percent critical value is 5.99. 
As shown in the table, all three statistics provide strong rejections of their respective null 
hypotheses. We take this as evidence that both the balance of payments approach and the 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis play a role in the determination of the real exchange rate, as 
predicted by the analytical model. 
Using the estimated cointegrating vector and the loading factors, we can decompose the real 
exchange rate into its permanent and transitory components, following the methodology 
described in the previous section. As already noted, the permanent and transitory 
components are the empirical counterparts of the equilibrium real exchange rate and its 
deviation from equilibrium, respectively. 
Figures 5 and 6 present the equilibrium exchange rate for the Argentine peso and the 
evolution of its misalignment (with 95 percent standard error bands19) since the inception of 
the currency board. In Figure 6, positive values imply an overvaluation of the multilateral 
rate, and negative values mean undervaluation.
The results reveal a large overvaluation of the peso at the end of the sample, reaching 
53 percent20 in 2001. This figure is somewhat higher than the overvaluation derived from a 
simple-minded PPP approach, which equals 43 percent in 2001. Likewise, the time profile of 
estimated misalignment derived from our model is quite different from that derived from 
the PPP approach. The PPP benchmark suggests that the real exchange rate was significantly 
overvalued throughout the period of analysis. In contrast, our estimations suggest that the 
peso was undervalued at the inception of the currency board (by about 20 percent), remained 
close to its equilibrium value from 1993 to 1997, and became grossly overvalued 
over 1998-2001. 
The main ingredient behind this rising overvaluation in the final years of the sample is the 
depreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate after 1993, shown in Figure 5. In the model, 
the time path of the equilibrium real rate reflects the evolution of equilibrium foreign assets 
and productivity differentials. From Figures 2 and 3, we can conclude that the depreciation 
of the equilibrium real exchange rate after 1993 was mostly driven by Argentina’s declining 
net foreign asset position relative to GNP, given that relative productivity, after a sharp 
increase in 1990-91, experienced only modest changes over the rest of the decade. 
19 See Appendix I in Alberola et al. (1999) for the derivation of the bands. 
20 More precisely, this is the difference between the logs of the actual REER and its equilibrium 
counterpart. The other figures quoted in this section also refer to log deviations. We use these 
deviations rather than percentages to allow straightforward additive decompositions of overall 
misalignment into its various components. 
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In principle, the steady fall in the ratio of net foreign assets to GNP could have been due to 
substantial current account deficits, sluggish growth, or both. In fact, Argentina ran 
persistent current account deficits over the 1990s, averaging 3 percent of GNP, although 
their magnitude increased in the second half of the decade. As for growth, it averaged a 
high 6 percent per year in the first half of the decade, but in the second half (1996-2001) it 
declined to an average of 2 percent per year. Further, growth turned negative at the end of 
the period (1999-2001). 
To disentangle the relative roles of sluggish growth and current account deficits in the 
observed evolution of the equilibrium real exchange rate, we performed two simulation 
experiments to assess the impact on the net foreign asset ratio of (i) maintaining a zero 
current account balance from 1991 to 2001; and (ii) 6 percent average growth over 
1996-2001 (while keeping the original current account balance unchanged). In the first case, 
we find that the “virtual” net foreign asset position would have been consistent with 
a 3 percent overvaluation in 2001 or, in other words, the real exchange rate would have been 
nearly in equilibrium at the end of the period. In the second simulation we find a more 
modest effect on the equilibrium real exchange rate: we are able to wipe out just 7 percent of 
the 53 percent estimated overvaluation. This suggests that overspending, rather than sluggish 
growth, was the main driving force behind the steady depreciation of the equilibrium REER. 
Finally, it is also interesting to view the degree of overvaluation of the peso that our 
estimates reveal for the final years of Convertibility in the light of the results obtained by 
Godfajn and Valdés (1999) from analysis of a large number of episodes of real 
overvaluation. As noted earlier, the evidence they report suggests the existence of a 
threshold of overvaluation beyond which correction of the misalignment without nominal 
devaluation becomes very unlikely. Indeed, in their sample few overvaluations 
exceeding 25 percent, and none above 35 percent, were undone without a collapse of the 
nominal exchange rate. Our estimates place the overvaluation of the peso in 2000 and 2001 
well above those thresholds, suggesting that at such point the collapse of the Convertibility 
regime had become virtually unavoidable. 
VI. The Currency Board: Wrong Peg or Diverging Fundamentals? 
In the previous section we have estimated the misalignment of the real effective exchange 
rate of the peso and explained its trajectory on the basis of the fundamentals implied by our 
model. In this section we take a different perspective in order to assess the role of changes in 
the real exchange rates of other currencies in the misalignment of the peso. In this regard, a 
number of observers have attributed the bulk of the misalignment to the appreciation of 
the US dollar against Argentina’s major trading partners –or, to put it differently, to the 
depreciation of the Euro and the Brazilian real (the currencies of Argentina’s top two trading 
partners) at the end of the1990s. In contrast, other analysts assign most of the blame for the 
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collapse of Convertibility and the ensuing crisis to the adoption by the authorities of 
economic (particularly fiscal) policies inconsistent with the hard peg21.
To assess these views, consider the following identity:

	
	
peginadequate
ˆ)(
lsfundamenta
diverging
)(ˆ $$$ qqqqqq AAA       (23) 
where we use the subscripts A and $ to denote the Argentine peso and the US dollar, 
respectively. This is just a decomposition of peso misalignment into three terms. The first 
one captures the divergence between the equilibrium REERs of the dollar and the peso. In 
the context of Argentina’s peg to the dollar, a nonzero value for this term implies a 
long-term divergence between the fundamentals of the anchor and client countries. To the 
extent that in the model presented earlier the fundamental determinants of the real exchange 
rate –the foreign asset position and relative productivity growth– can be affected by 
macroeconomic policies and structural reforms, we can relate this component of peso 
misalignment with persistent policy divergences between Argentina and the US, which in the 
long run are inconsistent with Argentina’s dollar peg. 
The other two terms in the right hand side of (23) capture the peso misalignment occurring 
even in the absence of policies inconsistent with the peg. Thus, we may view such 
misalignment as reflecting the inadequacy of the peg itself. It combines two items. One is the 
divergence between the actual REERs of the peso and the US dollar, captured by the second 
term on the right-hand side of (23). Since each REER can be expressed as a weighted sum of 
the bilateral real exchange rates of trading partners (where the weights are their respective 
trade shares), this term basically arises from differences between the trade structures of 
the US and Argentina. In practice, the key difference in their trade structures concerns 
Brazil, who is a major trading partner for Argentina but not for the US22. Hence, the time 
path of )( $qqA   is dominated by the real exchange rate of the Brazilian real, and we should 
expect this term to exhibit a significant increase in 1999 due to the abrupt devaluation of the 
latter currency. 
The rest of the misalignment attributable to inadequacy of the peg, captured by the last term 
in the right-hand side of (23), is just the misalignment of the REER of the US dollar, which 
the peso inherits through the peg. The logic of this term is quite simple: absent policy 
divergences and asymmetries in trade structure (already captured by the first two terms in 
the right-hand side of (23) above), pegging to a misaligned anchor currency necessarily leads 
                                                
21 See for example Mussa (2002). 
22 Brazil accounts for 30 percent of Argentina’s trade, but only for 2 percent of US trade. 
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to misalignment. In practice, existing empirical studies23 suggest that the dollar was 
overvalued after 1996-97, and thus we would expect this last term to add to 
the overvaluation of the peso in the final years of Convertibility. 
To implement empirically the decomposition in (23) we need an estimate of the 
misalignment of the US dollar real effective exchange rate in order to capture the last term in 
the right-hand side of the expression. To construct such estimate, we build from the work of 
Alberola et al. (1999), who report multilateral misalignments for the period 1980-98 for 
twelve OECD currencies, by extending their sample to the period 1999-01. Figure 7 reports 
the estimated real misalignment of the dollar that results from this procedure. Inspection of 
the figure indicates that during the first half of the 1990s the dollar was slightly undervalued, 
but in 1996 there was a change in trend which lead to an increasing overvaluation. By 1999 
the overvaluation was about 10 percent, and it rose to 15 percent in 2000 and over 20 percent 
in 200124.
Using Figure 7, we can calculate the decomposition in equation (23). Its results are shown in 
Figure 8, which reports the sources of the annual change in peso misalignment 
over 1993-2001 (with the changes measured by the first difference of the overall peso 
misalignment shown in Figure 6). 
The figure shows some salient facts. First, except for 1993, diverging fundamentals made a 
positive contribution every year; that is, given other things, they invariably added to 
overvaluation. Thus, Argentina’s economic fundamentals –in terms of productivity trends 
and spending relative to income– diverged persistently from those that would have been 
required to sustain the currency board. Ultimately, this suggests that the stance of 
macroeconomic policies and structural reforms was not tuned to the maintenance of 
Convertibility in the long run. 
Second, the role of peg inadequacy in the overvaluation of the peso was more erratic. Its 
contribution was positive in 1993, became negative in 1994-95 –thus pushing the peso 
towards undervaluation– and then returned to positive values throughout the rest of the 
sample period. Thus, the ‘wrong peg’ did add considerably to overvaluation in the final 
years of Convertibility. 
Further, the two components of this term –trade asymmetries and dollar overvaluation– also 
exhibited changing behavior over the period. Between 1994 and 1998 trade asymmetries had 
a negative contribution –i.e., they tended to render the peso undervalued. This is consistent 
with the appreciation of the Brazilian real over those years. However, its abrupt depreciation 
                                                
23 See Alberola et al. (1999). 
24 Subsequently the dollar depreciated by about 10 percent on a trade-weighted basis 
between mid 2001 and mid 2002. 
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in 1999 added a substantial push towards peso overvaluation (about 11 percent, as already 
noted). After that year, the contribution of trade asymmetries was fairly modest. Finally, the 
misalignment of the dollar also made a contribution of changing sign to peso misalignment. 
But from 1996 on, as the overvaluation of the dollar developed, the contribution became 
positive and also added to peso overvaluation. 
Figure 9 offers a different perspective on the same results. As we already saw, over 1993-97 
the real exchange rate of the peso was roughly in equilibrium, and its overvaluation 
developed after the latter date. Figure 9 shows the contribution of the three ingredients under 
consideration to the cumulative change in the misalignment of the peso over 1993-97 and 
1997-2001. The contrast between the two periods is revealing. During the first one, the 
misalignment of the peso barely changed. The figure shows that this was the result of two 
opposing forces: inconsistent fundamentals, that tended to render the peso overvalued 
(at a rate of 6.3 percent per year), and trade asymmetries, that worked in the opposite 
direction (by 6.1 percent per year). As a result, the net effect was almost negligible. 
Importantly, the contribution of dollar misalignment was small as well. 
In contrast, in 1997-2001 all three ingredients worked in the same direction towards 
overvaluation of the peso. Diverging fundamentals continued to contribute close to 6 percent 
per year to the overvaluation. But the inadequacy of the peg had also a positive, and even 
bigger, impact, primarily through the increasing overvaluation of the dollar, which by itself 
added almost 5 percent per year to overall peso overvaluation, and also through the reversal 
in the effect of trade asymmetries, as the appreciation of the Brazilian real ended with its 
collapse in 1999. 
VII. Conclusions 
Argentina’s Convertibility regime quickly led to nominal stability and financial deepening. 
However, it also allowed a large real appreciation to develop. Overvaluation of the peso has 
been underscored by many observers as one of the key ingredients in the Argentine crisis. 
This paper has assessed the degree of real exchange rate misalignment in Argentina over the 
Convertibility decade and has explored the main factors behind it. 
The paper develops a model in which the equilibrium real exchange rate is that consistent 
with both a sustainable balance of payments position (external equilibrium) and the efficient 
use of domestic resources (internal equilibrium). Thus the model encompasses two leading 
views of real exchange rate determination –the balance of payments and the 
Balassa-Samuelson approaches. In the model, the fundamental determinants of the 
equilibrium exchange rate are the stock of net foreign assets and the relative productivity in 
tradable and nontradable goods vis-à-vis trading partners. 
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Empirical implementation of the model to the Argentine peso reveals that its real exchange 
rate exhibits a unit root, which constitutes evidence against the PPP hypothesis. Further, we 
find evidence supporting the presence of a cointegration relationship between the real 
exchange rate and its fundamental determinants, as predicted by our model. Finally, the data 
allow us to reject the hypotheses that either the balance of payments approach or the 
Balassa-Samuelson approach alone suffice to explain the evolution of the real exchange rate. 
The results show that during the first years of the currency board, and coinciding with the 
stabilization of the economy after the hyperinflation episode of the late 1980s, Argentina 
enjoyed significant productivity increases relative to her trading partners, which may help 
explain the sharp real appreciation of the peso between 1990 and 1993. After the latter year, 
productivity stalled. We also note, however, the parallel process of foreign asset loss, which 
brought the stock of net foreign liabilities from 15 percent of GNP in the early 1990s to 
about 40 percent of GNP in 2001. In the model this implies a significant correction in the 
equilibrium real exchange rate. 
According to our results, after 1997 the peso became increasingly overvalued. By 2001, the 
overvaluation exceeded 50 percent. Our framework allows us to assess whether this reflected 
primarily the pursuance of macroeconomic policies inconsistent with the dollar peg, or the 
inadequacy of the peg itself for the Argentine economy –either because the dollar was the 
wrong anchor given the Argentine trade structure, or because the anchor was overvalued. 
Over 1997-2001, the period in which the overvaluation developed, we find that both factors 
share the blame. 
The paper’s results also cast some light on the retrospective policy debate about whether 
Argentina’s nominal peg could have been salvaged by letting deflation do its job to realign 
the real exchange rate. Given the international experience on how appreciations are reversed, 
the large magnitude of the overvaluation that the paper finds in the final years of 
Convertibility suggests that such course of action would have been very unlikely to succeed. 
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Figure 1. Real Effective Exchange Rate of the Peso
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Figure 2. Relative Productivity, Prices, and the Real Exchange Rate 
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Figure 3. Net Foreign Assets
(Percent of GDP)
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Figure 4. Argentina's Trade Structure, 1998 - 2000
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Figure 5. Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate
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Figure 6. Estimated Real Misalignment of the Peso
(Percentages)
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Figure 7. Estimated Real Misalignment of the U.S. Dollar
(Percentages)
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Figure 8. Source of Peso Misalignment
(Annual contribution of each factor)
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Figure 9. Sources of Cumulative Peso Overvaluation
 (Percentages)
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